Security Council Reform

Daria Kirilenko

July 28, 2008

 

The Security Council is frozen in time. Members of the General Assembly have long become discontented with unfair representation, inefficiency due to the veto, and the lack of transparency within this body of the United Nations. The Security Council vests all the power in the five victors of World War II though these countries are no longer the leading forces in today’s world.

Situations such as genocide in Darfur and human rights violations in Myanmar have been allowed to continue because of self interests of the Permanent Members. In 2004 China threatened to prevent direct military intervention with Sudan and both Russia and China are hindering the Security Council from acting in Myanmar due to profits from selling military and security equipment to its government.

To date there exist multiple proposals on how to reform the Security Council. The two main areas of focus are to increase the number of member countries to better represent all five continents, and to restrict the use of the veto. Reforms suggest increasing membership by 3 to 11 countries and to either impede the use of veto on humanitarian issues or completely discard it.

Unfortunately, because members of the Permanent Five have the power to block any proposal, and every nation has its own interests at heart, consensus on any reform will be difficult. Each member of the General Assembly must be willing to give up some of its privileges in order for all members to be stronger and function more effectively together.

Below is a list of various proposals made by countries and individuals on how to best reform the Security Council and where these proposals stand today on the U.N. agenda.

 

The "Overarching Process" Proposal

Kofi A. Annan's High-level Panel

"Uniting for Consensus" Amendment

The G4 Proposal

The S5 Proposal

The African Union Resolution

Concept of Weighted Voting

The Binding Triad Amendment

The Veto

 

For more information on the mission, structure, and history of the Security Council please click here

 

 

 

 

The “Overarching Process” Proposal
A document titled the “Overarching Process” developed by Cyprus suggests expanding the Security Council by increasing the number of member states to 22 countries.

The seven new seats would be allocated as follows:

1. Two to African States
2. Two to Asian States
3. One to Latin America and the Caribbean States
4. One to Eastern European States
5. One to “Western Europe and other” States

New would be determined by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly. From here the proposal suggests two possible scenarios. The first would allow seats to become permanent, but would also allow any Security Council member State to challenge a current seat-holding State at specific intervals (five years was suggested), thereby requiring it to stand for reelection. The country whose seat is being contested might, or might not, be reelected. The second scenario differs from the first in that it seeks to allocate the new seat to Eastern Europe, a regular non-permanent seat.

 

Kofi A. Annan’s High-level Panel
In 2004, then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change developed two models on how to reform the Security Council. The goal of the panel was, in part, to increase transparency and provide more equitable representation within the Council. The first model would increase the number of permanent seats to 11 without granting the new members the power of veto, and two-year non-renewable seats to 13.

The six new permanent seats would be distributed as follows:

1. Two to African States
2. Two to Asian States
3. One to European States
4. One to the Americas

The 13 non-permanent seats would be distributed as follows:

1. Four to African Sates
2. Three to Asian States
3. Two to European States
4. Four to the Americas

The second model proposes to create a new category of eight four-year renewable seats and increase two-year non-renewable seats by one. Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Americas will each get two four-year renewable seats.

The non-renewable seats will be increased by one and will be distributed as follows:

1. Four to African States
2. Three to Asia and the Pacific States
3. One to European States
4. Three to the Americas

The High-level panel also felt that the Security Panel should adapt the concept of “indicative voting,” which would call for members of the Council to publicly state their positions on a proposed action.

 

“Uniting for Consensus” Amendment
The “Uniting for Consensus” amendment was developed in 2005 and is strongly supported by Argentina, Italy, Canada, Colombia, China and Pakistan. It advises expansion of the Security Council’s non-permanent membership to 20 countries.

1. Six elected from African States
2. Five elected from Asian States
3. Four elected from Latin American and Caribbean States
4. Three elected from Western Europe and Other States
5. Two elected from Eastern Europe States

All issues would be decided by a simple majority vote and the use of the veto shall be restrained. Also the S.C. is called on to become more transparent. This would be achieved by holding more open meetings, consulting non-permanent members on issues being discussed and embracing rules of procedure agreed on by all members.

 

The G4 Proposal
The proposal to include Japan, Germany, India and Brazil (the G4 Nations) as permanent members of the Security Council is supported by these four nations along with France and the United Kingdom. The resolution suggests expanding the S.C. to 25 members by adding six more permanent members who would not have the power of veto and four more non-permanent members. New members would be voted in by a two-thirds majority.

Permanent membership would be increased by six seats, distributed as follows:

a. Two to African States

b. Two to Asian States

c. One to Latin American and Caribbean States

d. One to Western European and Other States

Non-permanent membership would be increased by four seats, distributed as follows:

1. One to African States
2. One to Asian States
3. One to Latin American and Caribbean States
4. One to Western European and Other States

The G4 proposal was debated by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005. The anti-G4 countries included Pakistan, Italy, China and the United States. Because of the opposition of these countries, it does not seem this proposal will be adopted in the foreseeable future.

 

The S5 Proposal
The S5 proposal assembled by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland, calls for interactive discussions between all members, informative reports on relevant issues, bringing non-permanent members into the decision-making process. Nations which are members of the U.N. should be included in meetings and consulted when the issue discussed is relevant to them. When a permanent member uses the veto they would have to explain their reasons for doing so.

Though never formally adopted many other proposals include parts of the S5 resolution and heed its call to make the Council more transparent and to restrict the use of the veto.

 

The African Union Resolution
The African Union resolution drafted by Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa in 2004, seeks to expand the Security Council to 26 member States. Permanent seats would be increased to 11 and non-permanent to 15 seats.

The permanent seats will add six seats to be allocated as follows:

1. Two to African States
2. Two to Asian States
3. One to Latin American and Caribbean States
4. One to Western European and other States

 

The non-permanent seats would add five seats to be allocated as follows:

1. Two to African States
2. One to Asian States
3. One to Eastern European States
4. One to Latin American and the Caribbean States

This is a fairly new proposal and has not yet been formally discussed in the United Nations.

 

The Concept of Weighted Voting
A different kind of proposal, developed by Professor Joseph Schwartzberg, calls for weighted voting. In this model four seats are given to individual countries: Japan, India, China, and the United States, and eight to multi-national coalitions like Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. Each multi-national region would select countries to represent it. The General Assembly will make the final decision among the candidates by means of vote. Each region would have a weighted vote based on the percentage of the total world population (P) they have and the percentage of the total financial contribution they make to the U.N. over a specified time period (C). This is expressed by the following formula:

W = (P + C + 8.33%)/3

A decision will be passed when it gains more than 50% of the total weighted vote on procedural matters and 2/3 of the vote on more complex issues. This system, Schwartzberg argues, will allow for all countries to be represented on the Security Council at a given time. Latin America, Asia and Africa as well as other countries will be given a voice and representation. Under this proposal, Schwartzberg argues, industrialized nations would not monopolize and take advantage of the Council.

He also says that the power of the veto would give permanent members an unfair advantage and should therefore be eliminated.

The system would be easy to update by regularly recalculating the WV index and possibly redrawing the boarders of the regions.

 

The Binding Triad Proposal
The Binding Triad is a proposal to reform the General Assembly which would allow the supermajority’s rule on U.N. issues. It is probable that a reform of the General Assembly will bring about a reform of the Security Council. In the Binding Triad amendment, each member is granted three votes: the first is a weighted vote based on the State’s population, the second, on how much each member contributes to U.N.’s financial fund, and the third is the one vote given to each member, as is the rule today. This would allow the General Assembly to function as a legislative body. A resolution would automatically be passed if it receives two thirds of each vote. This would allow the majority to rule in the G.A. This amendment has never been put on the U.N. agenda.

 

Reforming the Veto
The Permanent Five’s right to veto is hotly contested. Although proposals to discard the veto entirely appear unrealistic to many observers, there have been attempts to either limit the use of the veto or make it possible to overrule it, or to phase it out over a specific period. First, the use of the veto can be restricted to only critical circumstances. For example, if a permanent member is required to deploy its military. Second, the veto might only be made valid with the support of a specific number of other permanent members. Third, nations can agree in advance not to use the veto in certain circumstances. Forth, it could be nullified if it went against a decision of the World Court.

Though some of these alternatives have been included in various proposals, they have never been put on the U.N. agenda.